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Abstract 
Air Force (AF) Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) continually 
progresses the evolution of AF while achieving national security and military objectives.  
CD&E experiments on future challenges, procurement of new weapon systems and tests 
existing/innovative strategies as potential solutions.  The primary tool that CD&E utilizes 
in conducting these experiments is wargaming.  This thesis provides a foundation to 
incorporate logistics into Air Force Title 10 wargames.  More specifically, we capture Air 
Force Materiel Command’s (AFMC) Agile Combat Support (ACS) within an unclassified 
general wargame scenario.  Logistics has been omitted from wargames for a multitude of 
reasons throughout the years.  We develop a logistics simulation model of a simplified 
wargame scenario designed to be run within the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) 
Analysis Toolkit (ATK) version 4.0 before a wargame initiates.  We capture ACS within 
the stochastic simulation by incorporating engine failures, maintenance crews, 
ammunition, fuel, and various other logistics metrics.  By varying the types of sortie 
operations and the logistics support available, further insight is gathered on Blue Force 
capabilities.  We develop decision quality information to present to a decision maker by 
combining statistical and multivariate analysis.  Our approach showcases how to gather 
insights from ACS metrics, including development of a metamodel using only four 
metrics to successfully predict key ACS Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  Ultimately, 
we design, analyze and demonstrate that logistics can and should be incorporated into 
wargames.  
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INTEGRATING AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT WITHIN TITLE 10 WARGAMES 
I. Introduction 
This thesis provides an approach of capturing logistics within wargames.  
Wargaming has been used throughout the history of warfare to ensure battle commanders 
are prepared and informed of potential scenarios they might encounter. As time has 
progressed, the warfare has changed from tribal to medieval to trench to guerilla and now 
to modern warfare. As these types of warfare have evolved, the form of wargames has 
had to adapt ranging from table top discussion to combat model simulations. While the 
types of simulations used for wargames has adapted, there is still a typical flaw in 
omitting logistics from the models. The reasoning has been from a culmination of things, 
but the bottom line is with today’s budgetary constraints, battle commanders must be 
cognizant of the supplies that they require to complete missions and maintain the United 
States Air Force’s (USAF) dominance in air, space, and cyberspace.  
Problem Statement 
President Obama signed the “Priorities for the 21st Century Defense” on January 
3, 2012.  The memorandum states that there will be a rebalancing of US troops toward 
the Asia-Pacific region.  Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC/A4&A8) then conducted 
a study to determine how the Air Force (AF) assesses its capabilities in future air 
campaigns.  The results were astonishing because Agile Combat Support (ACS) is only 
accounted for 30 days into the future and are omitted from studies that assess long term 
armed conflicts such as wargames.  These results were not pleasing and something 
needed to be done to fix the gap between wargames and logistics.  This thesis effort is to 
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determine how ACS can be captured effectively and timely in Title 10 wargames.  These 
wargames are referred to as Title 10 due to the service chiefs’ responsibilities outlined in 
U.S. Code Title 10 to train their respective forces.      
General Issue 
Logistics has been continuously omitted from wargames for many reasons.  
Traditionally, logistics has been an afterthought because of the ability to continuously 
increase budgets to support armed conflicts.  As time is progressing, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) budget is increasingly more constrained with a growing emphasis on 
accurately projecting the costs associated with future engagements.  Wargaming has been 
the hallmark of US forces in determining how the US will overcome opponents.  The 
outcomes of these wargames highly influence location of personnel/equipment, 
procurement of weapon systems, and defining the tactics needed to be successful; 
however, not incorporating logistics is a failure that needs to be addressed.   
In recent years, computer simulations for wargames have been trying to capture 
logistics within their combat models.  The simulations have failed time and time again for 
many reasons.  One of the main issues of incorporating logistics into wargames is the 
conflicting aggregation levels of the models. Wargame combat models have primarily 
been used at the campaign level, while logistics simulation models have used a more 
detailed tactical level model without explicit modeling many combat operations.   
Wargame combat models have stayed at the campaign level because of the 
following:  
- Time saved by running a more aggregated model 
- The focus of wargames being on opponent decision making 
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- Commanders being overwhelmed by data from a lower level model  
   
Logistic models have been unable to run during wargames because of the short 
window of time to complete the model.  Wargames are completed on 24 hour cycles, but 
this short period in time makes it difficult to capture reasonable logistic impacts.     
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The goal of this study is to answer the following questions:  
1. What simulation platform is most appropriate for incorporating logistics 
into wargames?  
2. At what point should the logistics simulation being completed within the 
wargame process? 
3. Is there a logistics metamodel that can be adjusted and completed during 
wargames? 
4. What metrics are the most vital and able to represent ACS? 
 
Our goal is to produce a proof of concept logistics simulation within a wargame 
scenario to model the constraints and capabilities associated with ACS.  The results from 
this simulation are then garnered to develop further limitations and constraints regarding 
the capabilities of US forces.  We believe that the most ideal approach in capturing 
logistics within wargames is to complete a logistics simulation before the wargames 
begin and to capture key logistics outcomes in a metamodel.  This provides wargame 
commanders with more realistic force capabilities including ACS during a wargame and 
an opportunity to adjust their strategies based on these updates.  
Scope 
This research responds to a question from AFMC/A4/A8 regarding a method to 
capture logistics effectively and timely in a wargame.  The modeling of an enhanced or 
deployed logistics capability in support of a specific scenario needs to be broken down 
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into two subcomponents.  One component being the delivery of initial parts and 
equipment to support ACS in the wargame carried out by Air Mobility Command 
(AMC).  The other component is ACS logistic operations being conducted during the 
wargame handled by AFMC.  The primary objective of our research is to identify feasible 
metrics to capture ACS within a wargame and to present these metrics as part of military 
decision making process.   
This thesis focuses on the computer modeling of ACS in Title 10 wargames.  We 
work under the confinements and goals associated with United Engagements (UE).  We 
are not attempting to replace or construct a theory of war.  Rather this thesis attempts to 
use the ideas of previous wargames and answer its basic question of how a strategic 
wargame can capture logistics.   
Methodology 
We first develop a mission statement for logistics being incorporated into 
wargames.  This statement drives the analysis and determination along the course of the 
study.  After this we move into understanding why logistics has been omitted from 
wargames.  This cause leads into what type of simulation platform to utilize.  We develop 
a fictional wargame scenario around this simulation model and develop a proof of 
concept.  The analysis is partitioned into two cases.  The first case analyzes the entire set 
of output data from the simulation to develop constraints, limitations, and provide a more 
accurate representation of the ACS capabilities and constraints for forces involved in the 
wargame.  The second case revolves around the idea of developing a logistics metamodel 
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that can be run during an actual wargame.  Both of these cases focus on the goal of 
incorporating logistics into wargames.  
Summary 
This thesis explores the realm of the relationship between logistics and wargames.  
We discuss why there has been a lack of importance to incorporate logistics and what 
issues arise when wargames attempt to bring in logistics.  We focus specifically on ACS 
and develop a proof of concept that develops a further understanding of how to capture 
ACS capabilities and constraints for our forces included in the wargame.  A combat 
mission doesn’t just require a squadron of fighter jets; it also requires the personnel and 
equipment to support them.  The next chapter of this thesis provides an overview of 
wargames and the lack of connection between logistics and wargames.  
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II. Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to review literature on wargames, the issues 
associated with incorporating logistics into wargames, Agile Combat Support (ACS), and 
the Logistics Composite (LCOM) simulation model.  We begin the chapter by discussing 
the applications of wargames and how the USAF utilizes wargames.  We then investigate 
the underlying issues with capturing logistics in wargames.  Finally, we discuss how ACS 
is a part of AF logistics and why LCOM is the appropriate platform to complete a 
logistics model for a wargame.  
Wargame Overview 
Wargaming has been used throughout history as a fundamental tool in developing 
military strategy.  These strategies have then been incorporated into training, education, 
procurement, and many other areas of the US military (Perla, 1990:3).  The USAF 
defines wargames as “a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving 
two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an 
actual or assumed real life situation” (McHugh and Fischer, 1966:9).  The goal of 
wargames is ultimately communication (Perla, 1990:185).  This communication 
showcases the cause and effect of wargame weapon systems interactions and the 
decisions made by the commanders.  
This decision making is what sets apart a simulation from a wargame.  
Incorporating commanders as decision makers into wargame models allows for unique 
unrepeatable simulations.  Thus wargames are not regarded as analytical tools (Long, 
1993:5); however, this is the most essential part of wargames.  The human in the loop 
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allows wargames to be unpredictable and deviate from the mundane rules and algorithms 
utilized by computer simulations.  “Good wargames must be structured to help human 
players make decisions and allow them to learn about the effects of those decisions” 
(Perla, 1990:164). Ultimately, this human element of decision making is the key in 
providing the educational experience gathered from wargames.   
The educational experience is the ability of wargames to allow commanders to 
test warfare strategy against enemy opponents without having loss of life.  This asset 
increases the wargame commanders’ knowledge of war and increases their decision 
making abilities.  Wargames are able to achieve this because they use mathematical 
combat models to simulate the physical interactions between weapon systems (Perla, 
1990:164).  These models are developed to understand the Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) of one weapon system against an enemy force.  Wargame commanders then 
theorize and provide their decisions of force movement to the combat models.  In 
addition, opposing commanders are using similar weapon systems and strategizing to 
achieve their missions at the other’s expense.  This becomes an issue in today’s 
environment where USAF opponents are not at the same level of technology and the 
decisions that the opponents make are far different then gathered from the wargame.  
Models that can accurately capture the actual opponent’s supply, weapon systems, and 
decision making provide far more insight then playing a wargame against ourselves.  
Wargames have evolved overtime to minimize this issue of capturing an 
opponent’s decision making by forcing opposing commanders to study and become 
familiar with enemy tactics (Perla, 1990:203).  Their primary mission is to become 
knowledgeable in the enemy’s culture to develop a mindset that is the foundation to their 
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judgment during wargames.  Opposing commanders’ expertise in their respective enemy 
culture provides the necessary realism against the friendly forces, but it fails to provide a 
justification as to why an enemy force moves to a particular location or engages in an 
attack.  The issues that arise from here derive from the aggregation level of wargames. 
Dr. C. L. Helwig brought the concept of aggregation to light back in 1780 when 
he “employed a single playing piece to represent a large body of soldiers” (Perla 
1990:18).  Wargames follow Dr. Helwig’s idea by having their combat models operate at 
the strategic aggregation level.  At this level, like forces are gathered together to form 
wings, battalions, etc.  There isn’t individual weapon system versus weapon system as in 
tactical combat models, but instead a large force opposing another large force.  The 
inputs for the model are things to the effect of defeated army battalions and the outputs 
are surrendering.  The strategic combat model then uses computer algorithms to convert 
these inputs into outputs by using mechanisms that are not only militaristic but political, 
psychological, diplomatic, etc.  A great example as to why strategic combat models don’t 
only include military operations (e.g. destroying infrastructure) is the recent war in 
Afghanistan.  US forces have destroyed a large amount of infrastructure and controlled 
the land within the country in a short amount of time, yet the war continued for a decade.  
This example showcases how wars are not always symmetric and easily understood.  
Winning a war sometimes takes more than destroying enemy forces and that’s a reason 
why wargames are conducted at the strategic level.  Strategic combat models have the 
ability to incorporate symmetric and asymmetric effects.  The downside is that there is a 
vast amount of assumptions when running at the strategic level.  These assumptions take 
logistics for granted and assume that a forward operating base (FOB) maintains, operates, 
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and supports any mission used during the wargame.  The example of the “War on Terror” 
in Afghanistan is a perfect reason why logistics shouldn’t be assumed.  This type of war 
refocused from force on force attrition to prolonged forward sustainment.  The questions 
changed from how well our airpower can compete against the enemy forces to questions 
like the following:  
- What is the minimal amount of aircraft in the forward operating bases 
needed to maintain day to day operations? 
- Can the USAF continue to fund weapon system upgrades while 
maintaining overseas operations? 
- What is the cost/benefit of operating a FOB as opposed to long range 
weapon systems? 
 
These are only a small snapshot of questions regarding strategic level AF leaders, 
and as with the past, wargames are the likely tool to provide insights on these questions.  
The ongoing evolution of wargames must continue and have the ability to include the 
effects of logistics.  Incorporating logistics will more accurately represent the forces 
involved in wargames, but more importantly, allow wargames to be even better tools for 
answering questions in today’s world.  
USAF Wargames 
Wargames are used within several levels of the Air Force.  Each level provides 
different types of insight, but we concentrate on Title 10 wargames.  “As the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 gave the service chiefs responsibility under U.S. Code Title 10 to 
train, man, and equip their individual forces” (Ducharme, 2012:1).  The Air Force began 
conducting Title 10 wargames in 1995 by creating two types of wargames: Unified 
Engagement (UE) and Future Capabilities Game (Ducharme, 2012:2).  UE wargames are 
completed on even years with Future Capabilities Games being held on odd years.  These 
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two types of wargames have entirely different objectives, but we strictly focus on Unified 
Engagements.   
The goal of UE is to “address military challenges and concept exploration” within 
the Pacific and European theaters (Ducharme, 2012:2).  The wargames are conducted in 
theater and are based on technologies that are near term (approximately 12 years out).  
UE is established to be a tool that an operational Commander can use to develop and test 
campaign level strategies in their respective theater (Ducharme, 2012:43).  There are 
three teams or forces involved with the wargames.  The white team adjudicates; the Blue 
Force represents the US forces while the Red Force represents the enemy forces (Caffrey, 
2008:40).  The players during these wargames are the decision makers and are using 
history, culture, and doctrine to develop strategies and crisis action plans (Caffrey, 
2008:43).  Each UE is different and the rules for winning the wargame change; however, 
the main goal is not necessarily to win the wargame but to come out with useful insights 
on operational strategies (Haffa, 2001).  Because of the complexity of typical UE 
scenarios, constructive computer simulations are used to capture daily Red and Blue 
Force moves as well as adjudication of battlefield engagements.   
Logistics in Wargames 
There is no definitive date in which wargames were created.  It is due to the fact 
that wargames have been executed throughout the history of mankind.  The definitions 
vary but the heart of each definition remains the same.  Wargames are fictional studies 
carried out by military leaders to construct, amend and/or validate a war plan (Collins, 
2012).  There are various forms of wargames that are also carried out by the commercial 
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industry; however, we focus on US Air Force wargames and understand the role that 
logistics has played in wargames.  This section illustrates the shortcomings that logistics 
has had in wargames and the numerous issues involved with these shortcomings.   
One of the key issues of UE is a failure to evaluate the logistic operations (Haffa, 
2001).  Logistics is regarded as an operational constraint and fails to incorporate the 
“logistic support effects on campaign planning” (LaPlante et al., 1996:97).  Blue Forces 
overestimate their effectiveness level and completely disregard the logistics involved in 
supporting their campaign.  For example, the kill rates included in the simulations require 
that munitions be provided for each of the weapon systems; however, the amount of 
ammunition available is considered unlimited and use is not tracked (Haffa 2001).  This 
in turn over predicts the effectiveness of US forces, under predicts the red forces, 
underestimates the budget and provides less insightful results to a large number of 
policies and doctrine (Caffrey, 2008:37).   
Other reasons that logistics has failed to be captured in wargames are because 
logisticians/warfighters were excluded from the wargames (LaPlante, 1996:97) and the 
cost/complexity of incorporating logistics is far too great (Ducharme, 2012:4).  Over the 
last couple of decades logisticians and warfighters have been incorporated into 
wargames; however, there were still issues in capturing logistics in simulation models 
(LaPlante, 1996:97).   
The main reason for this matter was still the issues with complexity and cost of 
further developing the wargame models; but funding a project to develop and maintain 
logistics within a wargame simulation model is far less expensive than underestimating 
the budget for a war in the Pacific. 
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Agile Combat Support (ACS) 
Logistics impacts every facet of the Air Force.  From the delivery of F-35s to 
helmets delivered to Airmen, logistics plays a role.  The AF breaks logistics into two 
commands: Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).  
This paper focuses on the AFMC piece.  AFMC provides logistics by executing Agile 
Combat Support (ACS).  “ACS is the ability to create, protect, and sustain air and space 
forces across the full range of military operations” (Westhauser, 2011:1).  It is the Air 
Force’s capability that is responsible for determining what is deployed and how it will 
arrive and return to CONUS safely.   
The Air Force Doctrine Document 4-0 Combat Support defines ACS using the 
following attributes:  
- Agility: ensuring timely deployment concentration, adaptive employment 
and resourceful sustainment of air and space power (Westhauser, 2011:1). 
- Reliability: competency and health of personnel, dependability of 
equipment, and trustworthiness of information (Westhauser, 2011:2). 
- Integration: incorporate diverse parts into a common team to create a 
synergistic effect (Westhauser, 2011:2). 
- Responsiveness: ACS capabilities are the right size, correct time and 
location (Westhauser, 2011:2). 
 
ACS effects are measured by readied forces, prepared battlespace, positioned 
forces, employed forces, sustained forces, and recovered forces (Westhauser, 2011:3).  
These metrics are ultimately provided to the Commander Air Force Forces 
(COMAFFOR).  ACS then uses its master processes to apply the attributes and produce 
the desired effects set forth by the COMAFFOR.  ACS maintains, supplies, and 
distributes at “operating locations to achieve the mission and assure the operational utility 
of all personnel, materiel, equipment, and the operating location infrastructure” 
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(Westhauser, 2011:6).  The services that ACS provides include lodging, medical, 
religious, postal, maintenance, and many others (Westhauser, 2011:7).   
ACS is a part of every AF functional area and is a vital component in the Air 
Force’s mission to train, equip, and employ air and space power.  Omitting their role 
during wargames by assumptions is not a good practice.   
Logistics Composite (LCOM) Simulation Model 
The purpose of this section is to provide the readers with what the Logistics 
Composite (LCOM) simulation model is and why we feel that this is an appropriate 
model to use for our wargame.  
LCOM is a discrete event simulation that uses distributions and random number 
generators to capture maintenance and optimize manpower levels (Cole, 2007).  The 
LCOM model is a composite of modules, written in SIMSCRIPT II, which communicate 
with each other to function as a cohesive entity (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The three 
modules are: the Input Module that preprocesses the data, the Main Module that runs the 
simulation, and the Post Processor Module that analyzes post simulation data 
(AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The software is used to simulate studies concerning Air Force 
base level functions (e.g. maintenance and supply) and manpower studies.  This in turn, 
allows operators and strategic leaders to assess the availability of support resources and 
operational weapon systems (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
The original LCOM was created in 1966 by the Air Force Logistics Command 
and the Rand Corporation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  LCOM was initially utilized by 
organizations like the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Human Resource Lab, and 
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the Air Force Systems Command for various studies (Erdman, 2014:6).  The results of 
these studies provided insights to weapon system procurement and Air Force aircraft 
maintenance manning standards.  LCOM significantly aided in exploring the trade-offs 
between various types of assets used for weapon systems throughout the acquisition stage 
(AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The impacts of these studies were a key contributor to the 
overall reduction in weapon system costs (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
There have been an abundant amount of upgrades since its creation in 1966. 
Currently the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) operates and 
maintains LCOM.  Their most recent update of the model was released in 2014 and 
known as LCOM-ATK (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  While the interfaces have changed, the 
goal and applicability of LCOM remains the same.  LCOM is meant to capture logistics 
and provide insights of maintenance and supply to Air Force leaders (AFLCMC/EZJS, 
2013).  
One of the great things about this software is that it leaves a significant amount of 
control over the level of detail that the model environment possesses. This was vital in 
our research because the conflicting aggregation levels of wargames and logistic models. 
This was the key in choosing a logistics model as our base model as opposed to a 
wargame combat model.  The LCOM model is designed to simulate part failures, or other 
similar subsystems, and process the spares to capture the support system during an 
engagement over a given period of time (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  This allows its users to 
tailor the model into a plethora of different types of logistics.   
The Input Module decreases and reformats the data provided by users into a data 
structure appropriate for the Main Module (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  More specifically, 
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the Input Module gathers the parameters set by the user, constructs a flying program 
based in terms of sortie operations and/or activities requiring specific types of aircraft or 
non-aircraft resources (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The Input Module simply gathers all the 
data created by the user, generates sorties and creates the corresponding environment 
used in the Main Module. 
The Main Module carries out the simulations within the environment created by 
the user and the Input Module (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The Main Module process is as 
follows: it begins with the sortie schedule, incorporates part failures/malfunctions based 
on validated and historical data, gathers necessary resources to complete the scheduled 
sortie, allots the time required in making scheduled or unscheduled repairs, and 
incorporates the exchanges of the demand process for resources (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
Each of these described responses is only a small portion of what LCOM truly does.  The 
ability to describe the maintenance and support of aircrafts over multiple days, months or 
even years is a key factor on why the model has lasted and continues to thrive in today’s 
every growing world.  
The Post Processor Module provides users with the opportunity to conduct post-
simulation analysis on the data gathered from the Main Module (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
The data gathered from the Main Module is large and robust because it covers an 
extended period in time and tracks a large volume of entities.  The Post Processor Module 
consolidates all of these data points into various types of reports, and develops visual 
representations to provide further insights to its users (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
The output of LCOM-ATK is consolidated into reports (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  
The reports are groups of similar statistics or MOEs collected.  For example, statistics 
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gathered from aircraft activities are gathered into a single report referred to as Group C 
(aircraft).  The reports are gathered in Group A (mission), Group B (activity), Group C 
(aircraft), Group D (personnel), Group E (shop-repair), Group F (supply), Group G 
(equipment) and Group H (facility) (Erdman, 2014:28).  A complete listing of the 
measures used for our logistic simulation is included in Appendix A of this thesis.   
Summary 
This chapter discussed the history of wargames and the issues associated with not 
incorporating logistics.  The heart of the problem is the differences of fidelity between a 
typical wargame and logistics simulation.  Wargame simulations are aggregated at the 
campaign level, while logistics simulations are constructed with a higher level of detail at 
the operational/tactical level.  This difference in fidelity has been a key factor in 
wargames being played with the exclusion of logistics.  The next chapter of this thesis 
describes our methodology for incorporating logistics within AF wargames. 
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III. Methodology 
Solving how logistics can be captured during wargames requires our study to start 
from the beginning of wargames.  We explore what wargames are and why USAF 
performs wargames.  Once we understand the added benefits of wargames to USAF we 
can focus on why logistics should be incorporated.  This understanding ultimately helps 
us shape our methodology to capture ACS capabilities and constraints in a wargame.   
Wargame Overview 
There is no definitive date in which wargames were created.  It is due to the fact 
that wargames have been executed throughout the history of mankind.  The definitions 
vary but the heart of each definition remains the same.  Wargames are fictional studies 
carried out by military leaders to construct, amend and/or validate a war plan (Collins, 
2012).  There are various forms of wargames that are also carried out by the commercial 
industry; however, we focus on US Air Force wargames and understand the role that 
logistics has played in wargames.  This section illustrates the shortcomings that logistics 
has had in wargames and the numerous issues involved with these shortcomings.   
Wargames are used within several levels of the Air Force.  Each level provides 
different types of insight, but we concentrate on Title 10 wargames.  “As the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 gave the service chiefs responsibility under U.S. Code Title 10 to 
train, man, and equip their individual forces” (Ducharme, 2012:1).  The Air Force began 
conducting Title 10 wargames in 1995 by creating two types of wargames: Unified 
Engagement (UE) and Future Capabilities Game (Ducharme, 2012:2).  UE wargames are 
completed on even years with Future Capabilities Games being held on odd years.  These 
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two types of wargames have entirely different objectives, but we strictly focus on Unified 
Engagements.   
The goal of UE is to “address military challenges and concept exploration” within 
the Pacific and European theaters (Ducharme, 2012:2).  The wargames are conducted in 
theater and are based on technologies that are near term (approximately 12 years out).  
UE is established to be a tool that an operational commander can use to develop and test 
campaign level strategies in their respective theater (Ducharme, 2012:43).  There are 
three teams or forces involved with the wargames.  The white team adjudicates; the Blue 
Force represents the US forces while the Red Force represents the enemy forces (Caffrey, 
2008:40).  The players during these wargames are the decision makers and are using 
history, culture and doctrine to develop strategies and crisis action plans (Caffrey, 
2008:43).  Each UE is different and the rules for winning the wargame change; however, 
the main goal is not necessarily to win the wargame but to come out with useful insights 
on operational strategies (Haffa, 2001).  Because of the complexity of typical UE 
scenarios, constructive computer simulations are used to capture daily Red and Blue 
Force moves as well as adjudication of battlefield results.   
One of the main issues of UE is a failure to evaluate the logistic operations 
(Haffa, 2001).  Logistics is regarded as an operational constraint and a failure to 
incorporate logistics has an impact on campaign planning (LaPlante, 1996:97).  Blue 
Forces overestimate their effectiveness level and completely disregard the logistics 
involved in supporting their campaign.  For example, the kill rates included in the 
simulations require that munitions be provided for each of the weapon systems; however, 
the amount of ammunition available is considered unlimited and use is not tracked (Haffa 
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2001).  This in turn over predicts the effectiveness of US forces, under predicts the red 
forces, underestimates the budget, and provides less insightful results to a large number 
of policies and doctrine (Caffrey, 2008:37).   
Other reasons that logistics has failed to be captured in wargames is because 
logisticians/warfighters were excluded from the wargames (LaPlante, 1996:97) and the 
cost/complexity of incorporating logistics is far too great (Ducharme, 2012:4).  Over the 
last couple of decades logisticians and warfighters have been incorporated into 
wargames; however, there were still issues in capturing logistics in simulation models 
(LaPlante, 1996:97).  The main reason for this matter was still the issues with complexity 
and cost of further developing the wargame models.  But what senior leaders fail to 
understand is that funding a project to develop and maintain logistics within a wargame 
simulation model is far less expensive than underestimating the budget for a war in the 
Pacific. 
LCOM-ATK Overview 
In an effort to reduce cost, complexity and understanding of incorporating 
logistics into a wargame model, we felt that using a preexisting logistics model as the 
baseline would significantly reduce these three factors.  We needed a logistics model that 
ran at the operational level and contained all of the support personnel and equipment 
required to capture Agile Combat Support.  LCOM-ATK accomplished all of these 
requirements and had been used throughout the logistics community for decades.   
The model constructed for this paper was developed under the Logistics 
Composite Model (LCOM) Analysis Toolkit (ATK) version 4.0 which is a product of 
20 
AFLCMC/EZJS with support from Frontier Technology Incorporated (FTI).  LCOM-
ATK is a composite of modules written in SIMSCRIPT II, which communicate with each 
other to function as a unit (Erdman, 2014:13).  The three modules are: the Input Module 
that preprocesses the data, the Main Module that runs the simulation and the Post 
Processor Module that analyzes post simulation data (Erdman, 2014:27).  The software is 
used to simulate studies concerning AF base level functions like maintenance and supply.  
LCOM relies on the fact that through the simulation, the operators can assess the 
availability of support resources and operational weapon systems (Erdman, 2014:11).   
One of the great things about LCOM is that it leaves a significant amount of 
control to the user over the level of detail that the model environment possesses.  This 
was vital in our research because of the conflicting aggregation levels of wargames and 
constructive logistic models used for analysis.  This was the key in choosing a logistics 
model as our base model as opposed to a wargame model.  The LCOM model is designed 
to process spares and other like subsystems to capture the support system during an 
engagement (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  This allows its users to tailor the model and the 
three modules to capture a wide range of different types of logistics processes and 
resources while maintaining a manageable level of understanding and complexity.  The 
general flow for the three modules is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  LCOM Process (Erdman, 2014:27) 
The output of LCOM-ATK is consolidated into reports.  The reports or statistics 
collected are broken into groups that have a varying number of measures within them 
(AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  We used all of the measures described in each of the following 
groups in our analysis, but please note that they are only a subset of metrics available 
within LCOM-ATK.  A complete listing of the measures used for our logistic simulation 
can be found in Appendix A of this paper.  In addition, please note that throughout this 
paper measures, metrics, and statistics are equivalent.   
The first set of reports is Group A or also known as Key Mission Statistics 
(Erdman, 2014:28).  This group contains the metrics that provide a top level assessment 
of the missions conducted during the engagement (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  Metrics that 
deal with completing sorties, attrition, and supply wait times are found in Group A.  A 
subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Group A (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
The next set of statistics is Group B which encompasses all Key Activity 
Statistics (Erdman, 2014:28).  This group contains the metrics that provide a view of all 
the activities that are started in the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  Activities 
encompass all the movement of entities within the simulation.  Some examples of 
activities are: receiving engines, requesting ammunition, or time taken to receive 
maintenance parts.  A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in Table 2.   
Table 2.  Group B (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
Group C contains the Key Aircraft statistics (Erdman, 2014:28).  This group 
contains the metrics that provide a view of all the activities that are associated with the 
aircraft within the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  Group C focuses on metrics such 
as number of aircraft available, unscheduled maintenance conducted on the aircraft, and 
number of sorties completed.  A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in 
Table 3.   
Stat Description
A4 Number of sorties requested
A5 Number of sorties initiated
A7 Number of Attritions
A11 Average aircraft pre-sortie maintenance (hours)
A16 Average aircraft mission wait status (hours)
A20 Average aircraft post-sortie time (hours)
A26 Number of sorties completed
Stat Description
B1 Number of activities requested
B2 Number of activities started
B3 Number of activities cancelled
B4 Average time to get resources (hours)
B8 Average activity length (hours)
B12 Number of activities completed
B13 Number of exogenous activities requested
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Table 3.  Group C (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
The Key Personnel Statistics are gathered in Group D (Erdman, 2014:28).  This 
group contains the metrics that provide a view of all the activities that are associated with 
the personnel within the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  These statistics consider 
the entire maintenance population and focus on metrics incorporating the manhours used 
for activities.  A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in Table 4.   
Table 4.  Group D (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
Group E covers the Key Shop-Repair Statistics (Erdman, 2014:28).   This group 
contains the metrics that provide a view of all the activities that are associated with shop 
repair within the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The metrics in Group E are meant 
to show how well the shop is doing in repairing the aircraft.  Metrics like the number of 
items backlogged, the repair cycle time, and number of items in repair all provide a 
snapshot of the repair shops.  A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in 
Table 5.   
Stat Description
C1 Number of aircraft authorized
C2 Number of aircraft days available
C3 Percent sorties (including alert)
C4 Percent unscheduled maintenance
C5 Percent scheduled maintenance
C6 Percent NMCS
C7 Percent time waiting to fly
Stat Description
D1 Manhours available
D2 Percent utilization
D3 Manhours used
D4 Percent used for unscheduled maintenance
D5 Percent used – scheduled maintenance
D8 On-equipment manhours used
D9 Off-equipment manhours used
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Table 5.  Group E (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
The next set of statistics is Group F which contains the Key Supply Statistics 
(Erdman, 2014:28).  This group contains the metrics that provide a view of all the 
activities that are associated with the supply within the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 
2013).  The metrics in Group F are meant to show how well the supply side of logistics is 
performing using metrics such as the number of backorder days for a part, number of 
units demanded, and the number of cannibalizations.  A subset of the statistics gathered 
in this group is shown in Table 6.   
Table 6.  Group F (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
The Key Equipment Statistics are captured in Group G (Erdman, 2014:28).  This 
group contains the metrics that provide a view of all the activities that are associated with 
the maintenance equipment within the simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The metrics 
in Group G are meant to show how well the maintenance equipment is holding up for the 
simulation.  Are their issues with not having enough maintenance equipment to maintain 
the sorties being conducted?  Questions like this can be answered investigating the 
metrics in Group G.  A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in Table 7.   
Stat Description
E1 Number of rep gens or exog demands
E4 Average base repair cycle (days)
E10 Number of items in repair (EOP)
E11 Number of items backlogged (EOP)
Stat Description
F1 Authorized quantity
F3 Number of backorder days
F4 Number of units demanded
F8 Percent demands not satisfied
F9 Number of cannibalizations
F11 NMCS indicator
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Table 7.  Group G (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
The final set of metrics used for our wargame model is Group H which consists of 
the Key Facility Statistics (Erdman, 2014:28).  This group contains the metrics that 
provide a view of all the activities associated with the maintenance facilities within the 
simulation (AFLCMC/EZJS, 2013).  The metrics in Group H are meant to indicate the 
performance level of the maintenance facilities.  Are there enough maintenance facilities 
for the aircraft to be repaired or are there too many maintenance facilities that are not 
being utilized?  Questions like these can be answered with the metrics found in Group H.  
A subset of the statistics gathered in this group is shown in Table 8.   
Table 8.  Group H (Walker et al., 2010) 
 
Logistics Simulation 
Capturing logistics within wargames also requires a decision of when the logistics 
simulation should be conducted.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of running 
Stat Description
G1 Authorized quantity
G2 Equipment hours available
G6 Equipment hours used
G9 Number of backorder days
G10 Number of units demanded
G16 Percent demands not satisfied
G18 Number of units generated
Stat Description
H6 Facility hours used
H9 Number of backorder days
H16 Percent demands not satisfied
H17 Average hours used/demand
H19 Facility hours backlog (EOP)
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the logistics simulation before, during, or after the wargame?  In order to answer this 
question we first investigate what the goal of a wargame is.   
As stated previously, wargames are a tool for commanders to test combat 
strategies and understand the capabilities of enemy forces.  They are not necessarily 
designed to perform sensitivity analysis or optimization.  The loss of not capturing 
logistics within wargames primarily influences Blue Force capabilities.  There are various 
constraints that are lost when not considering logistics.  For example, a Blue Force 
Commander might overcome an enemy by using ten F-35s; but in actuality, the air base 
that the F-35s originate from can only maintain and operate eight F-35s due to the 
amount of maintenance facilities.  This example of an overestimation of Blue Force 
capabilities may lead to budget overruns, failing missions, loss of airmen, etc.  Thus the 
role of logistics is to further define a near actual representation of Blue Force capabilities 
by providing limitations and constraints.   
Now that we have defined the role of logistics within wargames, we can 
determine when would be the most appropriate time to run a logistics simulation.  The 
most ideal scenario would be to incorporate a logistics simulation to inform the decisions 
that the Blue and Red Force commanders make during the wargame.  This would provide 
the commanders with real time results and identify strategies that are feasible or 
infeasible.  The down side to running the logistics simulation during the wargame is that 
the setup and run times for logistics models are very high.  Completing a logistics 
simulation during an eight hour period would be highly unlikely.  Thus, a metamodel 
would need to be constructed.  This metamodel would need to reduce the amount of 
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variables, and in turn, provide a reasonable run time that would allow the logistics model 
to be completed during the wargame.   
A more likely scenario would be to run the logistics simulation before or after the 
wargame.  In both of these cases, commanders are provided with more realistic 
capabilities and understand the limitations of their respective forces.  If the model was to 
be executed after the wargame, then the logistics simulation could be modified to 
incorporate the wargame commanders’ strategies implemented during the wargame.  This 
would allow the logistics simulation to determine the feasibility of each of their 
strategies.  However, these feasibility results are provided after the wargame is concluded 
which doesn’t provide commanders with the opportunity to alter their approach.   
Because of this reason, we feel that the most appropriate time to capture logistics 
within wargames is before the wargame is played.  The commanders can adjust their 
strategies during the wargame because they are provided with logistics limitations and 
constraints before the wargame begins.  This is a very important benefit because this 
information can provide better insights from wargames.  As with any case, there are 
always downfalls to any approach.  The disadvantage for this case is that the model 
would not have the ability to incorporate the decisions made during the wargame.  But as 
we stated previously, the goal of logistics being incorporated into wargames is to provide 
more realistic capabilities of the forces.  Completing the logistics simulation before the 
wargame does this and provides the wargame commanders with information at an ideal 
moment in time.  We carry this approach a step further in later discussions, developing a 
metamodel from our logistics simulation to be used during the wargame.  
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The next step after selecting when our logistics simulation would be conducted is 
to construct the fictional scenario our wargame would portray.  The problem set forth for 
us through AFMC was to assist and provide insight on decisions made for the “Pivot to 
the Pacific.”  This is the idea that the US would shift its focus from the Middle East to the 
Pacific region.  Due to security concerns, the scenario for the wargame is completely 
fictional.  There are no real opposing forces, the flight times used to conduct sortie 
operations are not real, and the locations of both Blue and Red Forces do not reflect 
reality.  The idea of our study is to provide a proof of concept that a stand-alone logistics 
simulation can effectively capture a more accurate representation of the impact of ACS 
for a standard wargame scenario in a timely manner (before or during wargame play).   
The scenario takes place in the Pacific with three Blue Force units and two Red 
Force units.  The forces are captured in LCOM-ATK by having Blue forward operating 
bases (FOB) each conducting sorties via F-35s over two regions controlled by the Red 
Forces.  We constructed the model using a predefined set of Blue Force strategies to 
conduct air operations over a 180 day period. 
The lengths of UEs are typically 4-14 days, but we selected an extended period of 
180 days because logistics usually cannot be captured in a short window of time.  For 
example, running a scenario that lasted seven days wouldn’t capture logistics because the 
logistics operations would be near zero.  The question that then arises is at what point is 
logistics relevant?  Due to the scope and timeframe of this study, we feel that assuming 
180 days would be sufficient, but further analysis could determine the actual minimum 
amount of time needed to capture logistics.  Using this extended period of time also 
allows the users with the ability to extract a set of days matching the wargame length 
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from any point.  This then could determine what effects logistics would play during the 
wargame and provide more accurate starting logistics capabilities.  In addition, as we 
have seen with the wars with Iraq and Afghanistan, our future engagement planning 
should include a sustainment piece.  Thus selecting a time period of 180 days is 
reasonable because it allows logistics to be captured during both a surge and sustainment 
window.     
The three Blue FOBs each contain 24 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), 3 maintenance 
facilities, 6 maintenance crew members, ammunition, fuel and a vast amount of parts to 
repair on the JSF.  LCOM-ATK incorporates thousands of parts that can fail on the JSF, 
but we want to focus specifically on ACS by incorporating engine failures.  The failure of 
missions due to unscheduled maintenance and backorder days of engine spares provides 
more realistic force capabilities.  We want to explore questions like how many days 
would a JSF be unable to operate or what is the impact to day to day operations if an 
engine failure occurs.  Tracking engine failures and spares allows us to accomplish this 
and provides a sufficient representation of ACS within a wargame scenario.   
The Red Forces have no ability to defend against the JSF sortie operations but 
control two ground regions in the Pacific.  Due to this aspect, Red Forces are not able to 
attrite Blue Forces, however, this could be easily modified within LCOM-ATK.  In 
addition, we felt that this didn’t impact our overall goal for this thesis, which was to 
capture logistics in a wargame model.  Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the 
logistic simulation scenario.   
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Figure 2.  Wargame Scenario 
A sortie completed by the Blue Force is considered successful if the JSF is able to 
load ammo, refuel, pass maintenance inspections, takeoff, reach the Red base, and return 
to the Blue base it originated from.  The sortie operations vary in length based on the 
origin of the JSF.  Figure 2 shows the distances from each of the bases, while Figure 3 
captures the sortie operations modeled within LCOM-ATK.  We are not concerned with 
the ammunition hitting the desired mark or destroying a target, but are concerned with the 
amount of ammunition available.  Specifically, we focus on if enough ammunition is 
available to complete the sortie.  We are not varying the types of ammunition, but 
LCOM-ATK can be altered to incorporate various types of ammunition.  The goal of the 
logistic simulation for each sortie operation is to focus on the logistic support required to 
complete that specific mission.   
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Figure 3.  Simulation Model (Erdman, 2014:5) 
 
The logistics simulation has time steps of 24 hours and a time length of 180 days.  
The time step is selected for 1-day intervals because that is customarily the length for 
logistic models and how real world metrics are gathered.  We selected 10 replications 
because it provides a reasonable 95% half width for statistics collected.   
Analysis Methodology 
Logistics models typically are run at a low aggregation level and have high 
fidelity.  What this corresponds to is an output of a large number of variables and data 
points.  For example, our wargame scenario contained three Blue Force units and two 
Red Forces units with logistic support for the Blue Forces.  The Blue Force had one 
squadron of JSFs (24 x F-35) located at each FOB with ACS.  This resulted in an output 
of well over 100 metrics with 100,000 data points.  Presenting this to a group of decision 
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makers within a wargame is a daunting task because you want to inform decisions 
without overwhelming them.  
  We are capturing logistics in wargames to provide more realistic force 
capabilities.  Our analysis focuses on providing trends and limitations of the logistics 
simulation (e.g. sortie rates, engine failures, F-35 downtimes, scheduled maintenance, 
available ammunition, etc.).  We showcase what ACS can provide during surge and 
sustainment phases of operations.  These results are then provided to decision makers 
within wargames to understand what their force limitations are.  
In addition, we explore the feasibility of developing a metamodel that can be 
completed during a wargame.  We use various Multivariate Analysis techniques 
(Principal Component Analysis, Discriminant Analysis, Factor Analysis, and Artificial 
Neural Networks) to reduce the dimensionality while maintaining minimal loss of 
information.  The benefits of having the ability to run logistics metamodels during 
wargames are immense.  Commanders are given near real-time feedback on their 
decisions and can alter their strategies throughout the wargame.   
Conclusion 
The size of logistic models and the time constraints imposed during wargame 
play, require investigating whether there are alternative approaches to running a logistics 
simulation during a wargame to capture ACS within a wargame.  Specifically, should the 
logistics model be run before, during, or after the wargame?  Completing the model 
during the wargame is the ideal approach and is plausible, but is highly unlikely because 
of the time constraints and modifications to the model.  A metamodel would need to be 
33 
developed that can capture ACS with a small subset of logistic inputs and allow the 
model to run significantly faster.  The most practical approach is to complete the logistics 
simulation before the wargame.  Completing the model at this time allows logistics 
considerations to be included to provide commanders with more realistic force 
capabilities and to gain better insights from wargames.  The next chapter of this thesis 
analyzes these two approaches by using statistical and multivariate analysis.  
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IV. Analysis & Results 
The analysis section for this study is broken into two sub-categories.  The first sub-
category focuses on gathering the output data from the logistics simulation to develop 
further insights for the wargame.  The analysis utilizes graphs, 95% confidence intervals, 
and hypothesis testing to better define the effectiveness and limitations of Blue Forces.  
The second sub-category explores the development of a metamodel to provide a suitable 
logistics model to be run during the wargame.  This part of our analysis uses Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), Discriminant Analysis (DA), Factor Analysis (FA) and 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) on the output data from the logistics simulation to 
construct a metamodel.   
The output data from the logistic simulation is in the form of hundreds of thousands 
of points with 140 MOEs.  We partition the data into three groups to allow for testing and 
validation.  We use 70% of the data to perform analysis, 15% for testing, and 15% for 
validation.  In addition, the output data is not balanced in terms of the response variable 
(sortie completion or not).  We achieve approximately 85% success and 15% failure 
rates.  An unbalanced set of data affects both sub-categories of analysis, but we explicitly 
explain the issues that arise within the multivariate analysis discussion.  
The training and testing of the data is captured using the hold-out method for cross-
validation (Devijver and Kittler, 1982:10).  This method breaks the data into three groups 
to train the predictor, test the predictor, and validate the predictor.  As stated previously, 
we divided the output data into 70%/15%/15% for training, testing, and validation.  More 
specifics on how we partitioned the data are discussed with our multivariate analysis.      
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We use all of these different types of analysis to demonstrate that incorporating 
logistics into wargames provide commanders with more effective insights.  These 
insights carry over into many facets within the DoD that impact planning, development, 
and procurement of future weapon systems.   
Statistical Analysis 
A summary of the sorties completed during a single replication of the logistics 
simulation is provided in Figure 4.  This plot showcases the sortie completion rate for 
each Blue base throughout the 180 day campaign.  We chose to display a single 
replication because it shows significant differences in sortie completion rates by base.  
An average of the ten replications does not display this characteristic because of the 
randomness involved with LCOM-ATK and the fact that each replication is independent 
of each other.  We arbitrarily chose this replication to provide insight, and it is not more 
significant than any of the other replications.    
 
Figure 4.  Sortie Completion Rate 
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The graph in Figure 4 shows that all three bases start off relatively high in their 
respective sortie completion percentages (90-100%), but begin to draw down throughout 
the campaign.  Each of the Blue bases shows that they are completing approximately 
85% of their missions after the 95th day.  The average of the ten replications for sortie 
completions agreed with this finding (85% mission success rate), and achieved an 
average success rate of 83%.  Another insight from the single replication plotted in 
Figure 4 is that there are spikes indicating significant drops in completing missions.  
These drops in the plot can come from any number of things, but a good initial area to 
explore is in unscheduled maintenance.  
A spike might occur because of unscheduled maintenance due to engine failures 
or other parts needing repair on the JSF.  These unscheduled events do not allow the JSF 
to be operationally ready, and in turn, not complete the mission.  Figure 5 showcases the 
JSFs unscheduled maintenance rates for each Blue base throughout the 180 day 
campaign.  Please note that Figure 5 is the unscheduled maintenance rate for the same 
single replication used in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 5.  JSF Unscheduled Maintenance Rate 
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Figure 5 does have spikes that indicate a significant increase in unscheduled 
maintenance on the same days as the drops in sortie completion rates as shown in Figure 
4.  For example, on day 31 Base B completed approximately 72% of its missions that 
day.  This was a drop of 28% in one day.  Day 31 on Figure 5 shows a large increase in 
unscheduled maintenance for that day.  Insights like this can be found looking throughout 
plots, but it is time consuming and difficult to provide significance and understanding of 
why things are occurring.   
We transfer over to conducting statistical analysis on the logistics simulation 
output data and determine if there are added insights that can be provided to wargame 
commanders.  Some key statistics are provided in Table 9.  These statistics are gathered 
from the entire set of replications from the logistics simulation.  
Table 9.  Logistics Simulation Analysis 
 
Table 9 showcases the mean, standard deviation and 95% half width for each of 
the Blue bases.  There is a trend with each of the MOEs displaying Base C performing 
better than Base B and Base A.  This might occur because of the distances involved with 
each of the Blue bases and their Red ground area to attack.  The greatest change between 
the Blue bases in Table 9 is the sortie completion rate.  Base A was completing 
approximately 87.5% sorties while Base C was completing 91.9% sorties.  This is 
Mean St Dev 95%HW Mean St Dev 95%HW Mean St Dev 95%HW
87.5 4.6546 2.8849 88 5.2813 3.2733 91.9 7.0658 4.3793
7.4722 3.4405 2.1324 7.4836 3.3188 3.5357 7.8277 3.5357 2.1914
35.446 10.463 6.4848 37.422 10.419 6.4577 39.589 10.382 6.4346
8.4 4.5018 2.7902 7.6 4.1539 2.5746 6.5 2.8659 1.7763
12.682 3.3517 2.0773 11.276 3.5058 2.1729 9.8136 3.4598 2.1444
0.5675 0.0552 0.0342 0.5179 0.0665 0.0412 0.4884 0.0684 0.0424Msn Wait Time (hr)
Base C
Sortie Comp (%)
Sortie Comp (#)
JSF Op Ready (%)
Unsched Mx (%)
Sched Mx (%)
Base A Base B
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interesting because you would assume that all the bases would perform at around the 
same level, but the distance of sorties might be a factor in this case as well.  
 We conduct a hypothesis test in which our null hypothesis is that Base A has the 
same sortie completion rate as Base C.  We use a two sample paired T-test at an alpha 
level of .05 with no assumptions required for the two samples variances.  After 
performing the test, we reject the null hypothesis because our T statistic is -6.996, which 
is less than our T critical value of -1.968.  This implies that the sortie completion rate for 
Base A is not equal to sortie completion rate of Base C; however, the difference in means 
of the two bases is low (4.4%).  We investigate further by producing a 95% confidence 
interval (CI) on the difference of means of sortie completion rates for both Base A and C.  
We obtained a 95% CI of [3.1597, 5.6403] which indicates that the means are in fact not 
equal because the interval does not contain zero, and that Base C is better than Base A by 
about 5% in sortie completion rates.  This insight might drive an analysis to be conducted 
on why is there a difference between the bases and/or determine whether a FOB should 
even be located in Base A.   
We then conduct a hypothesis test in which our null hypothesis is that Base A has 
the same JSF operational rate as Base C.  This metric determines how many JSF are 
operationally ready and can complete sortie operations on a daily basis.  We use a two 
sample paired T-test at an alpha level of .05 with no assumption required for the two 
samples variances.  After performing the test, we reject the null hypothesis because our T 
statistic is -3.77 and is less than our T critical value of -1.968.  This implies that the JSF 
operational rate for Base A is not equal to JSF operational rate of Base C.  Constructing a 
95% confidence interval on the null hypothesis that the difference in means of JSF 
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operational ready rates is zero provides more insight.  We obtained a 95% CI of [3.461, 
4.8234] which indicates that the means are in fact not equal because the interval does not 
contain zero, and that Base C is better than Base A in JSF operationally ready rate.  This 
insight might alter a wargame commander’s strategy in not utilizing Base A as much and 
focus on conducting more operations with Base C.   
This small subset of statistical testing demonstrates the type of information we 
can provide commanders during wargames to more accurately represent their forces and 
capabilities.  For example, commanders might be conducting operations with three full 
JSF squadrons per day.  This would result in 72 sortie operations in a day; however, if 
you incorporate ACS into the wargame, our logistics simulation showcased that only 
approximately 24 sorties can be accomplished per day.  This is a very important insight 
because the number of JSF squadrons, ammunition, available engine spares, maintenance 
crew members, amount of fuel, etc. would need to be increased to maintain the Blue 
Force capabilities captured in the wargame.  In either case, the wargame commander may 
alter their strategy with this more accurate information gathered from incorporating ACS 
capabilities.  
Multivariate Analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to develop a data screening approach that results in 
validated predictive metamodels.  We use various multivariate analysis techniques to 
provide decision quality information from the output data to assist the decision makers in 
making informed judgments in an expeditious timeframe.  The goal of each of the 
techniques we discuss is to better understand the observations (output variables) from our 
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simulation and develop approaches to more efficiently and effectively use the 
observations in evaluating selected MOEs.  We select sortie completion as the response 
variable for our study; however, many other MOEs are available within LCOM-ATK for 
a similar analysis.      
The logistic simulation output database consists of 140 variables that captured 
ACS over 180 days in the Pacific region.  The data gathered is completely fictitious, but 
the scenario modeled in LCOM-ATK could be quickly and easily altered to represent an 
actual wargame scenario.   
We partition the data into three groups to allow for testing and validation.  We use 
70% of the data to perform analysis, 15% for testing, and 15% for validation.  Each data 
point contains output for a single replication over 180 days.  The data points are 
randomly selected using the Excel random function by assigning each data point a 
random number between 0 and 1.  The top 70% are used for analysis, the next 15% for 
testing, and the bottom 15% for validation.  We then ensure that each set of data contains 
approximately equal balances in terms of success and failures of the response variable 
(sortie completion or not).  We achieve approximately 85% success and 15% failure rates 
for each of the sets.  An unbalanced set of data may affect the multivariate analysis 
techniques in correctly predicting sortie completed (SC) or not (SNC).  The models may 
tend to gravitate towards the heavier weighted response and continue to predict that 
response, which in turn, may skew the prediction levels.  We address this issue within 
each of the multivariate analysis techniques.   
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Principal Component Analysis (PCA)   
The first technique performed is Principal Component Analysis (PCA) which is a 
statistical method that determines which principal components are important to the 
observations or simulation output variables.  Principal components (PC) are orthogonal 
transformations of given correlated variables that transform into a set of linearly 
uncorrelated variables (Jolliffe, 2002:11).  In other words, PCA uses eigenvectors 
(direction of the data) and eigenvalues (variance of the data) to determine which are the 
highest scores.  The eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue becomes a principal 
component (Abdi and Williams, 2010:436).  Essentially, PCs are the directions of the 
data where there is the most amount of variance.  The purpose of PCA is to reduce the 
dimension of the observations by identifying patterns with minimal loss of information 
(Jolliffe, 2002:9).   
PCA was conducted on the output data with no issues encountered while 
performing this analysis.  All variables and data points were included in the analysis.  
The first step in performing PCA is determining how many components should be 
included in the metamodel.  Horn’s test provides this answer and is shown in Figure 6.  
All Principal Component (PC) scores above the blue line pass the test and are 
recommended for the metamodel.   
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Figure 6.  PCA Horn's Test 
 Horn’s test shows that 27 PCs passed and thus we continue the analysis with this 
subset of PCs.  In addition to this test, Kaiser’s criterion was calculated and received a 
score of 0.9688 which is categorized as “Marvelous.”  To ensure a minimal loss of 
information, an analysis on the variance explained by the PCs is captured in Table 10. 
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Table 10.  PCA Variance Explained 
 
As shown in Table 10, the first 16 PCs explain approximately 80% of the 
variability, which is an acceptable level.  We then compute the loadings matrix with 16 
principal components and determine which scores are the highest values in each of the 
respective rows.  Interpreting these results provides no insight on patterns; however, we 
have significantly reduced the dimension size.  We now move into determining if patterns 
are formed between SC and SNC through the various principal components. 
The final step in PCA is to plot the PC loading scores amongst each other and 
determine if there is a set of PCs that developed patterns to distinguish between SC and 
SNC.  Figure 7 shows the best combination of PCs with PC1 vs.  PC9; however there are 
no clear patterns that distinguish between the two classes.  These plots can distinguish 
sorties not completed from sorties completed but not the reverse.   
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Figure 7.  PC1 vs. PC9 
 
The validation set produced the plot in Figure 8.  This plot represents the same 
process and methodolgy that the training set underwent.  The goal of the validation plot is 
to determine whether the patterns formed in the training set mimic the patterns formed in 
the validation plot.   
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Figure 8.  PC1 vs. PC9 Validation 
As Figure 8 showcases, the plot matches the patterns formed in Figure 7.  The 
plot in Figure 8 confirms that the training set analysis shown in Figure 7 is correct and 
validates the analysis.   
In conclusion, PCA is able to reduce the dimensionality; however, it doesn’t have 
the ability to distinguish between the two classes which results in a low overall prediction 
level.  In addition, an interpretation of the principal components is not conclusive because 
of the immense amount of variables associated with each of the PCs.   
Discriminant Analysis (DA)  
The next analysis conducted is Discriminant Analysis (DA).  DA is a statistical 
method to determine a categorical dependent variable, such as sortie completion, by one 
or more predictor variables (Johnson, 1992:39).  The method begins with gathering a set 
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of observations, in which, the values of the interval variables are known.  This produces a 
training set which is then used to determine whether the developed predicted model is 
correct (Härdle, 2007:63).  The goal of DA is to decide which continuous variables 
discriminate between two or more groups (Johnson, 1992:45).  This approach can reduce 
dimensionality and still maintain a high level of prediction in distinguishing if a sortie is 
completed or not.  
In performing DA, we decided to remove all the non-continuous variables due to 
singularities invalidating matrix multiplication.  We remove 32 variables from the 
analysis and continue with 108.  Conducting the analysis produces the plot captured in 
Figure 9.  This chart demonstrates the amount of variables removed and how well the 
model is predicting the result.   
 
Figure 9.  DA Model Efficiency 
Figure 9 shows that with 67 variables removed (41 remaining), the model is able 
to predict approximately 61% for SC, 80% for SNC, and an overall prediction level of 
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70%.  We believe that an overall prediction level of 75% is acceptable which occurred 
when 12 variables removed (96 remained).  This analysis shows that it could reduce the 
dimensionality and continue to have a high prediction level; however, the reduction in 
dimensionality wasn’t as far as we would have liked.  We are hoping to develop a 
metamodel that contains less than 5 variables and maintains an accurate prediction level 
of no less than 75%.   
Factor Analysis (FA)  
The third technique used is Factor Analysis (FA).  FA is a statistical method to 
investigate variable commonality and factor reduction (Kim, 1978: 3).  FA follows the 
same principals as PCA, but uses a rotated loadings matrix.  The purpose of FA is to 
reduce the number of factors and to detect relationships between factors by classifying 
variables (Thompson, 2004: 11).  It also provides insight in grouping factors together to 
understand the relationship each of the factors have in the overall picture of the model 
(Kim, 1978: 5).   
As with PCA, the same process is in place and produces the same results up until 
the loadings matrix.  The loadings matrix for FA contains rotated data and generates 
alternate score referred to as Factor scores.  As shown in Table 11, the Factor scores are 
listed in the loadings matrix and the highlighted values are the Factor scores with the 
maximum values in their respective rows.  Please note that Table 11 contains a subset of 
the loadings matrix.  The full loadings matrix is too large to include, but the concept 
remains the same for the entire matrix.  
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Table 11.  FA Loadings Matrix 
 
The next step is interpreting the Factors based on the highlighted values in each of 
the corresponding Factors.  This is not helpful due to the immense size of the loadings 
matrix and was not able to produce an insightful interpretation of each of the Factors.  
The final step in FA is to produce plots that compare Factors amongst each other to 
determine if there are patterns formed to distinguish between SC and SNC.  Such a plot is 
shown in Figure 10.   
 
Figure 10.  Factor 3 vs. Factor 10 
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Figure 10 shows that FA is able to distinguish SNC from SC because of the tight 
grouping of red; however, it is not able to distinguish SC from SNC because the red 
points are intertwined with the cluster of blue points.  
 
Figure 11.  Factor 3 vs. Factor 10 Validation 
Figure 11 is the validation plot for FA.  This plot shows that it mimics the same 
pattern as shown in Figure 10 and thus FA is validated.  However, none of the plots 
(including Figure 10) show any significant distinct patterns being formed.  There is no 
clear distinction between red and blue clusters meaning that the model doesn’t have the 
ability to distinguish between SC and SNC.  We conclude that FA is able to reduce the 
dimensionality of the variables, but it isn’t able to provide an accurate prediction level.   
Artificial Neural Network (ANN)  
The last analysis we perform is Artificial Neural Networks (ANN).  ANN is a 
statistical model that estimates functions and performs pattern recognition (Schalkoff, 
1997: 2).  The model works such that the inputs are multiplied by weights and then 
computes the output of the ANN (Zurada, 1992: 36).  In other words, there are nodes and 
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interaction of nodes referred to as connections in ANNs.  The nodes are simply networks 
(or variables) that receive inputs and process them to yield outputs (Hagan, 1996:21).  
The connections of these nodes develop a global behavior that we cannot see because of 
the complexity and the amount of nodes (variables) (Zurada, 1992: 37).  The goal of 
ANN is to reduce the number of variables while maintaining minimal loss of information 
from the given observation set (Yegnanarayana, 2009:3). 
ANN is a methodology that continually removes variables from the model and 
outputs its prediction levels for each class (SC and SNC).  We utilize ANN by 
eliminating the variables within a model and output its classification accuracy in a Signal 
to Noise Ratio (SNR) plot.  This plot is found in Figure 12.   
 
Figure 12.  ANN Signal to Noise Ratio 
The full model is able to predict at the 87.3% prediction level.  We feel that 
stopping at iteration 136 (four variables remain) is acceptable because it maintains a 
prediction level of 85.2%.  The four remaining variables are ammunition, fuel, engine 
spares, and maintenance crews.  These variables explain the most amount of variability in 
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the logistics simulation model and are very promising to see.  As we discussed in Chapter 
2 of this paper, ACS maintains, supplies, and equips personnel and facilities.  These ANN 
results showcase that ammunition, fuel, engine spares, and maintenance crews are key in 
capturing ACS through our selected MOEs.  These variables could, in turn, be used to run 
statistical analysis before, during, or after the wargame.   
To ensure that the ANN is accurate in predicting the class, we develop a 
confusion matrix as shown in Figure 13 where Class 1 is SC and Class 2 is SNC.   
 
Figure 13.  ANN Confusion Matrix 
Figure 13 shows that the training set was able to obtain an overall prediction level 
of 85.5%, validation set has an 82.3% overall prediction level, testing set has an 89.2% 
overall prediction level and the entire set achieves an overall prediction level of 85.6%.  
These prediction levels all validate that the model is working effectively.  The levels are 
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all within a reasonable distance of each other.  In addition, this overall prediction level of 
85.6% far exceeds our minimum requirement of obtaining a 75% prediction level.   
As we stated previously, our data set is unbalanced in terms of our response 
variable.  We didn’t have a 50/50 split between SC and SNC.  The result of this 
unbalanced set is that the ANN models make biased decisions towards the majority class 
(Ganganwar, 2012:1).  In other words, the ANN models constructed for this paper 
gravitate towards predicting SC and cause the prediction levels to be skewed.  The 
amount of skewness was not determined for our study.  A reasonable assumption for the 
potential effect based upon the literature is on the order of 5% for each class.  Further 
analysis could be completed to determine appropriate measures to address this issue; 
however, this was beyond the scope of our study.  Some alternative approaches are 
oversampling, undersampling, adjusting the weights assigned to the classes, adjusting the 
decision threshold, the snowball method, and/or the k nearest neighbor (kNN) method 
(Ganganwar, 2012:2).   
ANN is able to reduce the model from 140 variables to 4 variables with a 
prediction level of approximately 85%.  The remaining variables are ammunition, fuel, 
engine spares and maintenance crews which are able to effectively capture ACS.  These 
variables could be used to showcase to commanders what the limitations and constraints 
of ACS are within wargames.  In addition, these variables are the metrics that would be 
used to develop a metamodel that has faster run times and the capability to provide real 
time logistic impact during wargames.   
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Summary 
We provide a framework of the analysis that could be conducted before a 
wargame begins.  We use statistical analysis with plots, paired t-tests, and confidence 
intervals to show that Base C was performing better than Base A in JSF operational ready 
rates and sortie completion rates.  These two insights are then able to provide Blue 
commanders with the more realistic capabilities of their force.  Our second analysis used 
multivariate analysis to reduce the number of variables and develop a metamodel.  We 
successfully completed these two goals by using ANN and showcase that ammunition, 
fuel, engine spares, and maintenance crew metrics are key in capturing ACS through our 
selected MOEs.  This is a very important finding because we can use these metrics not 
only in the metamodel, but also in statistical analysis.  With both of these analyses, we 
are able to demonstrate through a proof of concept that a logistics simulation can and 
should be incorporated into future wargames because they provide more realistic force 
capabilities by capturing ACS constraints and limitations.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this thesis is to gain insights on the incorporation of logistics 
within wargames.  Including logistics provides wargames with more accurate 
representations of Blue Forces, and strengthens the insights gathered from wargames.  
Combining these two aspects allows for considerations of development, deployment, 
employment, and procurement of future weapon systems within the DoD.   
Conclusions of Research 
There have been numerous reasons why logistics have failed to be incorporated 
within Title 10 wargames.  Wargames have been designed to test armed strategies against 
opposing forces over a short time window.  Under this design, it has also been assumed 
that logistics can support any reasonable set of operations conducted during a wargame.  
As shown in Chapter 4, including logistics in a wargame provides commanders with a 
more accurate idea of forces available for combat operations.  There are issues involved 
with maintenance, supply, and manpower that limit the number of combat sorties that can 
be completed on a daily basis.  The bottom line is that incorporating logistics into 
wargames provide more realistic representation of Blue Force capabilities.     
In the recent past, a separate logistics simulation has been modified and 
completed at the conclusion of a wargame.   There has been minimal success with this 
approach because feasibility results are provided several days after the wargame is 
completed.  This approach doesn’t allow Blue Force commanders to alter their approach 
and retest their updated strategies in the wargame scenario; however, the results have 
shown interesting results with omitting logistics from wargames.  These results have 
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brought greater attention to the incorporation of logistics within wargames because they 
have showcased that the assumption that logistics can support all operations during 
wargames is false.  While these are great results, this still leave the fundamental issue 
with completing the separate logistics simulation model after the wargame has concluded.  
The most ideal approach would be to modify existing wargame combat models 
and include logistics within them.  As we discussed in Chapter 2 of this paper, this is not 
an easy task because of the conflicting aggregation levels between logistic simulations 
and combat models.  This conflict comes down to a difference in metrics and processes 
that might not have the ability to communicate with each other within a single simulation 
platform.  The ability to provide instantaneous results to commanders is an immense 
benefit though.  It makes the wargame more realistic because it forces commanders to 
provide near real-time decisions, and in turn, provide better insights.  As we discussed in 
Chapter 3, this still leaves the issue of long run times.  Constructing a single wargame 
model that captures attrition, decision making, and logistics is not feasible due to these 
and other reasons.   
The most appropriate approach would be to utilize a logistics simulation prior to a 
wargame.  This allows for ACS to provide further representation of Blue Forces and 
provide more impactful insights from wargames by allowing commanders to alter their 
strategies during the wargame.  In addition, a number of excursions could be run with the 
logistics simulation model to mimic possible decisions made by commanders during 
wargames.  Ultimately, completing the logistics simulation model before a wargame 
provides plenty of time to modify, complete and analyze the separate logistics model. 
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We’ve discussed at what point in the process to run a logistics simulation, but we 
needed to also determine how we could incorporate ACS within Title 10 Wargames.  We 
felt that using a proof of concept with a separate logistics simulation model incorporated 
into a wargame scenario showcased this.  It demonstrated that the setup, run times and 
analysis could all be completed within a reasonable amount of time.  It also showed that a 
logistics model could be tied in with a wargame by providing further interpretations of 
the capabilities of Blue Forces through analysis of key ACS MOEs.  
We selected to use LCOM-ATK as our platform because it allows its users full 
control over the model constructed and captures the missions that ACS performs.  We 
successfully developed a fictional wargame scenario in the Asia-Pacific region that has 
three Blue FOBs conducting operations over two Red ground areas of control over a 180 
day period.  The Blue offensive forces were composed of a squadron of JSF per FOB, but 
the main component of the model was the supply and maintenance of the JSF.  Wargames 
have used aggregated forces such as a full squadron of JSF to be used against enemy 
forces, but we want to show that ACS can only operate and maintain a portion of that 
squadron a day.  
The analysis of the output of the logistics simulation was partitioned into two 
cases.  The first case focused on analyzing the data prior to the wargame.  We used plots, 
95% confidence intervals, and hypothesis tests to provide Blue Force commanders with 
more realistic representations of their forces.  Our analysis showed that the average 
number of sorties that could be completed per day was 8 sorties, and that ACS could 
operate and maintain 30% of the JSF squadron.  This is a key insight because wargame 
commanders should recognize some level of degraded operational capability.  Insights 
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like this drive many factors within the DoD.  This forces decision makers to determine 
matters such as procuring more units of an aircraft and/or funding for more personnel in 
AFMC to operate and maintain a larger amount of sorties.  
The second case for our analysis was to complete Multivariate Analysis 
techniques on the logistics output data.  This type of analysis was used to determine key 
ACS factors and reduce the dimensionality of logistics models.  We used the 70/15/15 
rule in regards to analyzing, testing and validating the data.  PCA, FA and DA were all 
able to reduce the dimensionality of the logistics model but the reduction was not enough.  
ANN was able to produce a metamodel by reducing the dimensionality of the logistics 
model to four variables while obtaining a prediction level of 85% for correctly classifying 
a sortie as being completed or not.  More importantly, the four variables that remained 
were ammunition, fuel, engine spares, and maintenance crews that showcase ACS can be 
captured and communicated to commanders using a minimal subset of factors.  
Essentially, these four ACS inputs can accurately predict force capabilities.  We picked 
sorties completed (SC) or not (SNC) as our response variable, but we could use this same 
approach for other factors.  Our metamodel, in this case an ANN, has significantly lower 
run times and the ability to accurately predict Blue Force capabilities utilizing the four 
ACS factors.  This ANN is designed to be run at the end of a wargame move to provide 
commanders a more realistic picture of the force capabilities available for the next move.    
Incorporating logistics into wargames is not an easy task.  Approaching the 
problem by capturing logistics processes in combat models is not feasible because there 
are too many issues with conflicting aggregations levels to proceed with this approach. 
As we showcased in this paper, utilizing a verified, validated and accredited logistics 
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simulation model is the most practical approach.  It allows ACS to further describe Blue 
Forces by inputting their limitations and constraints within the stochastic logistics 
simulation model.  Using various analytical techniques, we were able to show that 
ammunition, fuel, engine spares, and maintenance crews are very important in describing 
ACS.  These metrics have the ability to predict and provide commanders with meaningful 
results.  In the end, wargames must evolve once again, and incorporate logistics within 
them.  This evolution ensures commanders are given insights that continue to maintain 
the United States Air Force’s (USAF) dominance in air, space, and cyberspace.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis provides opportunities for future work within wargames and logistics.  
The lessons learned throughout the process of developing a proof of concept showcased 
various areas that need further development.   
Analyzing/Prolonging Wargames 
The individuals that have designed wargames throughout the years have 
constructed them such that they are meant to test and develop combat strategies over a 
short time window.  There has been little, if any, analysis on longer duration wargames in 
Unified Engagements.  With today’s ever increasing constrained budget, wargames can 
provide a tool in which senior leaders exercise and evaluate combat operations over a 
longer period in time.  This would allow analysts to better determine the costs and 
resources associated with a sustained engagement.  An approach that could be utilized for 
this would be to add extra time at the end of standard wargames to consider longer term 
engagement.  This approach would allow for further analysis and a better representation 
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of readiness levels and force capabilities after initial surge.  We recommend performing 
an analysis on the methodology and length that wargames currently use.   
When Logistics Impacts 
We arrived at a question of when does logistics impact a mission.  We came to 
our conclusion that 180 days is sufficient because it allows for operations to carry out and 
for parts to begin to fail.  Performing a model with too few days doesn’t allow for 
processes to breakdown nor be impactful.  We recommend performing an analysis on 
determining what the minimum, average and maximum amount of time required to 
capture logistics within simulations. 
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Appendix A: Measures of Effectiveness 
 
 
 
A1                       NUMBER OF 
MISSIONS REQUESTED
A20                       AVG. AC 
POST SORTIE TIME(HRS)
B1                       NO. OF ACTIVITIES 
REQUESTED
A2                       NUMBER OF 
MISSION ACCOMPLISHD
A21                       MIN POST 
SORTIE TIME(HRS)
B2                       NO. OF ACTIVITIES 
STARTED
A3                       PERCENT 
ACCOMPLISHED
A22                       MAX POST 
SORTIE TIME(HRS)
B3                       NO. OF ACTIVITIES 
CANCELLED
A4                       NUMBER OF 
SORTIES REQUESTED
A23                       STD DEV 
POST SORTIE TIME(HRS)
B4                       AVG TIME TO GET 
RESOURCE(HRS)
A5                       NUMBER OF 
SORTIES INITIATED
A24                       NO. OF 
POST SORTIES COMPLETED
B5                       MIN TIME TO GET 
RESOURCE(HRS)
A6                       PERCENT 
INITIATED
A25                       NO. OF 
PLUGGED SORTIES
B6                       MAX TIME TO GET 
RESOURCE(HRS)
A7                       NUMBER OF 
ATTRITIONS
A26                       NUMBER 
OF SORTIES COMPLETED
B7                       STD DEV TO GET 
RESOURCE(HRS)
A8                       NUMBER OF 
RAM REPAIRS
A27                       AVG 
SORTIE LENGTH (HRS)
B8                       AVG. ACTIVITY 
LENGTH    (HRS)
A9                       # OF AIR 
ABORTS
A28                       MIN SORTIE 
LENGTH (HRS)
B9                       MIN. ACTIVITY LENGTH    
(HRS)
A10                       # OF 
SYMPATHETIC AIR ABORTS
A29                       MAX 
SORTIE LENGTH (HRS)
B10                       MAX. ACTIVITY 
LENGTH    (HRS)
A11                       AVG. AC 
PRESORTIE MAINT.(HRS)
A30                       STD DEV 
SORTIE LENGTH (HRS)
B11                       STD DEV ACTIVITY 
LENGTH (HRS)
A12                       MIN 
PRESORTIE MAINT.(HRS)
A31                       AC WHICH 
WENT INTO MISN WAIT
B12                       NO. OF ACTIVITIES 
COMPLETED
A13                       MAX 
PRESORTIE MAINT.(HRS)
A32                       # OF FWR 
MISSIONS REQUESTED
B13                       # EXOG ACTIVITIES 
REQUESTED
A14                       STD DEV 
PRESORTIE MAINT.(HRS)
A33                       # OF FWR 
MISSIONS ACCOMPLISHD
B14                       NO. ACTIVITIES MIN 
CANCELLED
A15                       NO. OF PRE 
SORTIES COMPLETED
A34                       # OF FWR 
SORTIES  REQUESTED
C1                       NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 
AUTH.(EOP)
A16                       AVG. AC MISN 
WAIT STATUS(HRS)
A35                       # OF FWR 
SORTIES INITIATED
C2                       NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT-
DAYS AVAIL
A17                       MIN MISN WAIT 
STATUS(HRS)
A36                       # OF 
ENGINE FAILURES
C3                       PCT SORTIES(INCL 
ALERT)
A18                       MAX MISN 
WAIT STATUS(HRS)
A35                       # OF FUEL C4                       PCT UNSCHED 
MAINTENANCE
A19                       STD DEV MISN 
WAIT STATUS(HRS)
A35                       # OF 
AMMUNITION
C5                       PCT SCHED   
MAINTENANCE
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C6                       PCT NMCS C25                       %NOT MISSION 
CAPABLE/NMC RATE
D19                       DEPRECATED STAT
C7                       PCT TIME WAITING TO 
FLY
D1                       MANHOURS AVAILABLE D20                       NMCM INDICATOR
C8                       PCT TIME WAIT 
RESOURCES
D2                       PERCENT  UTILIZATION E1                       NO. OF REP GENS OR EXOG 
DMDS
C9                       PCT OPERATIONALLY 
READY
D3                       MANHOURS USED E2                       PCT BASE REPAIR
C10                       AVG. AC POST SORTIE 
TIME(HRS)
D4                       PCT USED - UNSCHED 
MAINT
E3                       PCT DEPOT REPAIR
C11                       MIN. AC POST SORTIE 
TIME(HRS)
D5                       PCT USED - SCHED   
MAINT
E4                       AVG. BASE REPAIR CYCLE 
(DAYS)
C12                       MAX. AC POST SORTIE 
TIME(HRS)
D6                       PCT USED AS A PRIME E5                       MIN. BASE REPAIR CYCLE 
(DAYS)
C13                       STD DEV POST SORTIE 
TIME(HRS)
D7                       PCT USED AS A 
SUBSTITUTE
E6                       MAX. BASE REPAIR CYCLE 
(DAYS)
C14                       REQUESTED SORTIES/ 
AC /DAY
D8                       ON-EQUIP MAN-HOURS 
USED
E7                       STD DEV BASE REPAIR CYCLE
C15                       ACHIEVED  SORTIES/ AC 
/DAY
D9                       OFF-EQUIP MAN-
HOURS USED
E8                       PCT TIME ACTIVE REPAIR
C16                       FLYING HOURS D10                       NUMBER OF MEN 
DEMANDED
E9                       PCT TIME WAIT RESOURCES
C17                       AVG. FLYING HOURS / 
AC / DAY
D11                       NO. OF MEN 
DEMANDED POST SCAN
E10                       NO. OF ITEMS IN REPAIR 
(EOP)
C18                       AVG. AC PRE SORTIE 
TIME (HRS)
D12                       PCT PROV. BY 
ONHAND BAL.
E11                       NO. OF ITEMS BACKLOGGED 
(EOP)
C19                       MIN. AC PRE SORTIE 
TIME (HRS)
D13                       PCT PROV. BY GEN 
SUBS
F1                       AUTHORIZED QUANTITY
C20                       MAX. AC PRE SORTIE 
TIME (HRS)
D14                       PCT PROV. BY 
EXPEDITE
F2                       PCT PROV. BY PRIME ONHAND 
BAL
C21                       STD DEV PRE SORTIE 
TIME (HRS)
D15                       PCT PROV. BY 
PREEMPTION
F3                       NUMBER OF BACKORDER-DAYS
C22                       NO. OF PRE SORTIES 
COMPLETED
D16                       PCT DEMANDS NOT 
SATIS.
F4                       NUMBER OF UNITS DEMANDED
C23                       NO. OF POST SORTIES 
COMPLETED
D17                       OVERTIME 
MANHOURS USED
F5                       PCT PROV. PRIME OR SUBS
C24                       %MISSION CAPABLE/MC 
RATE
D18                       SIMULATED MH PER 
FLYING HOUR
F6                       PCT PROV. BY EXPEDITE
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F7                       PCT PROV. BY 
PREEMPTION
G13                       PCT PROV. BY GEN 
SUBS
F8                       PCT DEMANDS NOT 
SATIS.
G14                       PCT PROV. BY 
EXPEDITE
F9                       NUMBER OF 
CANNIBALIZATIONS
G15                       PCT PROV. BY 
PREEMPTION
F10                       NO. ITEMS ON 
BACKORDER (EOP)
G16                       PCT DEMANDS NOT 
SATIS.
F11                       NMCS INDICATOR G17                       EQUIP HOURS 
BACKLOG (EOP)
F12                       NUMBER OF ORDERS G18                       NUMBER OF UNITS 
GENERATED
F13                       NUMBER OF TURN-
INS
G19                       NO. ITEMS ON 
BACKORDER (EOP)
G1                       AUTHORIZED 
QUANTITY
H6                       FACILITY HOURS 
USED
G2                       EQUIPMENT HOURS 
AVAIL.
H9                       # OF BACKORDER 
DAYS
G3                       PCT USED  - UNSCHED 
MAINT
H16                       % DEMANDS NOT 
SATISFIED
G4                       PCT USED  - SCHED   
MAINT
H17                      AVERAGE HOURS 
USED/DEMAND
G5                       PCT AVAIL - UNUSED H19                     FACILITY HOURS 
BACKLOG (EOP)
G6                       EQUIPMENT HOURS 
USED
G7                       PCT USED AS A PRIME
G8                       PCT USED AS A 
SUBSTITUTE
G9                       NUMBER OF 
BACKORDER-DAYS
G10                       NUMBER OF UNITS 
DEMANDED
G11                       NO. UNITS 
DEMANDED POST SCAN
G12                       PCT PROV. BY 
ONHAND BAL
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Appendix B: Multivariate Analysis Code 
%PCA & FA Train Final 
clc 
clear all  
close all 
  
%load data 
PCATrain = xlsread('test.xls'); 
%Indicator variable 
load result.mat 
  
%Correlation matrix 
cMat = corr(PCATrain(1:738,1:41)); 
  
%Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors 
[V,D] = eig(cMat); 
  
%Sort eigenvalues 
D = sort(diag(D),'descend'); 
  
%Horn's curve 
% horn = xlsread('FinalHorns.xls'); 
% figure 
% hold on 
% x = linspace(0,10,40); 
% plot(x,horn,'b',x,D,':r*') 
% title('Horns Test') 
% legend('Horns','Eigenvalues') 
  
%Variance Explained 
OneVec = D(1,1)/sum(D); 
TwoVec = D(2,1)/sum(D); 
cumTwo = OneVec + TwoVec; 
ThrVec = D(3,1)/sum(D); 
cumThr = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec; 
FourVec = D(4,1)/sum(D); 
cumFour = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec; 
FiveVec = D(5,1)/sum(D); 
cumFive = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec; 
SixVec = D(6,1)/sum(D); 
cumSix = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec + SixVec; 
SevVec = D(7,1)/sum(D); 
cumSev = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec + SixVec + 
SevVec; 
EigVec = D(8,1)/sum(D); 
cumEig = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec + SixVec + SevVec 
+ EigVec; 
NineVec = D(9,1)/sum(D); 
cumNin = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec + SixVec + SevVec 
+ EigVec + NineVec; 
TenVec = D(10,1)/sum(D); 
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cumTen = OneVec + TwoVec + ThrVec + FourVec + FiveVec + SixVec + SevVec 
+ EigVec + NineVec + TenVec; 
  
%Training Scores 
stdMat = zscore(PCATrain(1:738,1:41)); 
%Load matrix 
PCALoadMat = V*sqrt(diag(D)); 
FALoadmat = rotatefactors(PCALoadMat(:,1:10)); 
%Scores matrix 
FAscoresMat = stdMat * inv(cMat) * FALoadmat;  
PCAscoresMat = stdMat * inv(cMat) * PCALoadMat(:,1:10); 
  
%Validation Scores 
stdValMat = zscore(PCATrain(739:1055,1:41)); 
%Load matrix 
PCALoadMat = V*sqrt(diag(D)); 
FALoadmat = rotatefactors(PCALoadMat(:,1:10)); 
%Scores matrix 
FAValdscoresMat = stdValMat * inv(cMat) * FALoadmat;  
PCAValdscoresMat = stdValMat * inv(cMat) * PCALoadMat(:,1:10); 
  
%Kaiser index 
[ifs2]= IFS2(FALoadmat); 
ifsFA=sqrt(ifs2) 
[ifs2]= IFS2(PCALoadMat); 
ifsPCA=sqrt(ifs2) 
  
%PCA Training Plots 
for i=1:10  
for j=i+1:10  
figure  
    
gscatter(PCAscoresMat(:,i),PCAscoresMat(:,j),result(1:738,1),'br','x.')  
    legend('SC','SNC')  
    title('Principal Component Analysis')  
    strName=sprintf('PC %d',i);  
    xlabel(strName)  
    strName2=sprintf('PC %g',j);  
    ylabel(strName2)  
end  
end 
  
%FA Training Plots 
for i=1:10  
for j=i+1:10  
figure  
    
gscatter(FAscoresMat(:,i),FAscoresMat(:,j),result(1:738,1),'br','x.')  
    legend('SC','SNC')  
    title('Factor Analysis')  
    strName=sprintf('Factor %d',i);  
    xlabel(strName)  
    strName2=sprintf('Factor %g',j);  
    ylabel(strName2)  
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end  
end 
  
%PCA Validation Plots 
 for i=1:10  
for j=i+1:10  
figure  
    
gscatter(PCAValdscoresMat(:,i),PCAValdscoresMat(:,j),result(739:1055,1)
,'br','x.')  
    legend('SC','SNC')  
    title('Principal Component Analysis Validation')  
    strName=sprintf('PC %d',i);  
    xlabel(strName)  
    strName2=sprintf('PC %g',j);  
    ylabel(strName2)  
end  
 end 
  
% FA Validation Plots 
for i=1:10  
for j=i+1:10  
figure  
    
gscatter(FAValdscoresMat(:,i),FAValdscoresMat(:,j),result(739:1055,1),'
br','x.')  
    legend('SC','SNC')  
    title('Factor Analysis Validation')  
    strName=sprintf('Factor %d',i);  
    xlabel(strName)  
    strName2=sprintf('Factor %g',j);  
    ylabel(strName2)  
end  
end 
 
%DA 
clc 
clear all  
close all 
  
%load data 
DATrain = xlsread('DATrain.xls'); 
LCOMData = DATrain; 
outMat = LCOMData(:,1:41); 
  
%1 
SC=LCOMData(1:1254,1:141); 
SNC=LCOMData(255:end,1:141); 
cov_SC=cov(SC); 
cov_SNC=cov(SNC); 
mean_SC=mean(SC); 
mean_SNC=mean(SNC); 
prior_SC=254/17652; 
prior_SNC=498/17652; 
66 
  
diq_SC=zeros(752,1); 
diq_SNC=zeros(752,1); 
y=zeros(752,1); 
for i = 1:17652 
diq_SC(i)=-.5*log(det(cov_SC))-.5*(outMat(i,1:41)-
mean_SC)*inv(cov_SC)*(outMat(i,1:41)-mean_SC)'+log(prior_SC); 
diq_SNC(i)=-.5*log(det(cov_SNC))-.5*(outMat(i,1:41)-
mean_SNC)*inv(cov_SNC)*(outMat(i,1:41)-mean_SNC)'+log(prior_SNC); 
if diq_SC(i)>diq_SNC(i) 
    y(i)=1; 
end 
end 
class=[diq_SC diq_SNC y]; 
correct1=sum(y(1:12654)); 
wrong2=sum(y(255:17652)); 
confusion_1=[correct1 1265-correct1;wrong2 17862-wrong2] 
  
test_with=zeros(2,1); 
test_without=zeros(2,1); 
test_result=zeros(2,1); 
for i = 1:2 
   test_with(i)=-.5*log(det(cov_SC))-.5*(outMat(i,1:141)-
mean_SC)*inv(cov_SC)*(outMat(i,1:141)-mean_SC)'+log(prior_SC); 
   test_without(i)=-.5*log(det(cov_SNC))-.5*(outMat(i,1:141)-
mean_SNC)*inv(cov_SNC)*(outMat(i,1:141)-mean_SNC)'+log(prior_SNC); 
  
if test_with(i)>test_without(i) 
    test_result(i)=1; 
end 
end 
[test_with test_without test_result] 
  
temp=corr([LCOMData(:,1:141) max(diq_SC,diq_SNC)]); 
loadings1=temp(end,1:141)' 
[~,ind]=min(abs(loadings1)); 
LCOMData(:,ind)=[]; 
GM(:,ind)=[]; 
 
%ANN  
%load data 
  
LCOM = xlsread('test.xls') 
  
post =1; 
  
if post == 0 
    %noise generator 
    x = rand(17642,1); 
  
    %create data matrix 
    temp = [x LCOM(:,1:141)]; 
    data = temp(:,[1 2]); 
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    %std data 
    input = zscore(data);  
  
    %create output matrix 
    ouput = [LCOM(:,142),1 - LCOM(:,142)]; 
     
else 
  
    snr=[]; 
  
    wts=net.IW{1,1}; 
  
    dim=size(wts); 
  
    noise=wts(:,1)'*wts(:,1); 
  
    for j=2:dim(2) 
  
        snr(j)=10*log10((wts(:,j)'*wts(:,j))/noise) 
  
    end 
  
end 
 
%ANN NPRScript 
clear all 
close all 
count=1; 
load('cleandata') 
load('label_proj') 
data=cleandata; 
output=data(:,1); 
data(:,1)=[]; 
input=zscore(data); 
permmat=[]; 
  
while count < 2 
  
inputs = input'; 
targets = output'; 
  
% Create a Pattern Recognition Network 
hiddenLayerSize = 141; 
net = patternnet(hiddenLayerSize); 
  
  
% Setup Division of Data for Training, Validation, Testing 
net.divideParam.trainRatio = 70/100; 
net.divideParam.valRatio = 15/100; 
net.divideParam.testRatio = 15/100; 
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% Train the Network 
[net,tr] = train(net,inputs,targets); 
  
% Test the Network 
outputs = net(inputs); 
errors = gsubtract(targets,outputs); 
performance = perform(net,targets,outputs) 
permmat=[permmat performance]; 
figure 
plotconfusion(targets,outputs) 
trainTargets = targets .* tr.trainMask{1}; 
valTargets = targets  .* tr.valMask{1}; 
testTargets = targets  .* tr.testMask{1}; 
trainPerformance = perform(net,trainTargets,outputs) 
valPerformance = perform(net,valTargets,outputs) 
testPerformance = perform(net,testTargets,outputs) 
  
  
snr=[]; 
wts=net.IW{1,1}; 
dim=size(wts); 
noise=wts(:,1)'*wts(:,1); 
for j=2:dim(2) 
    snr(j)=10*log10((wts(:,j)'*wts(:,j))/noise); 
end 
  
snr 
[val ind]=min(snr(2:end)); 
minind=ind+1 
input(:,minind)=[]; 
count=count+1; 
end 
 
 
69 
 Appendix C: Quad Chart 
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